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1Abstract
This paper examines the eﬀects of the demographic change and the government debt
policy in Japan on economic growth and economic welfare, particularly by taking into account
the existing public pension scheme as well as national medical expenditure through the
existing public health insurance, where a computational overlapping generations model is
used within a general equilibrium context. One of the main results of this paper is that
the tax burden (GDP) ratio will increase up to about 36%, and the social security burden
(GDP) ratio will increase up to 23.3% in 2050, even though the government tries to have a
positive primary balance by 2010. The ratio of public health insurance beneﬁts to GDP is
expected to increase at 1% every 10 years, and the ratio will be around 9.6% in 2050. The
2004 public pension reform will successfully result in a 13 point decrease in the contribution
rate from 36.44% to 23.53%, and reduce the social security burden (GDP) ratio by about 8
points from 23.27% to 15.02% in 2050, compared with the benchmark case.
JEL: H55, E27
Key Words: government deﬁcits, an aging population, public pension scheme, public health
insurance, intergenerational redistribution, overlapping generations model, simulation
21 Introduction
This paper examines the eﬀects of the demographic change and the government debt policy
in Japan on economic growth and economic welfare, particularly by taking into account the
existing public pension scheme as well as national medical expenditure through the existing
public health insurance, where a computational overlapping generations model is used within a
general equilibrium context.
One of the main features of this paper is to incorporate medical expenditure through the
existing public health insurance into the existing literature (Kawade et al. 2005, and Kato
2002a, 2002b), where the computational overlapping generations model has been used within a
general equilibrium context in order to discuss several future government policies.
As has been pointed out by several papers (Iwamoto 2004, Tokita 2002), a rapid aging
population in Japan will result in a successive increase in national medical expenditure through
the existing public health insurance as well as in a rapid increase in the contribution rate of the
existing pay-as-you-go public pension scheme provided that the existing systems are maintained
in the future. From the individual’s point of view, the eﬀect of an aging population would be
very important, since an aging population induces an increase in the premium of the public
health insurance due to the reason that the amount of public medical insurance beneﬁts to the
elder people over 70 years old would be more than 4 times as much as other cohorts. The fact
that the elder people possibly needs highly medical thus more expensive equipment/treatments
results in the elder people being more “expensive” than other cohorts. Thus, the technical
progress in medical science furthermore increases national medical expenditure with an aging
population.
All data used in this paper has been based on SNA. Some data was obtained from other
sources, but they have been manipulated in order to be consistent with SNA by using relevant
SNA data. Outstanding government debts and a public pension fund are taken into account,
both of which were obtained from SNA. The public pension fund is considered separately from
outstanding government debts, and in this sense the government deﬁcits are given in gross values
in this paper(1).
(1)In SNA the ﬁgures of governments debts are given in net values of central and local governments debts, where
ﬁnancial assets owned by governments are taken into account. Thus, since our paper uses the SNA data, ﬁnancial
assets owned by governments are incorporated into our analysis.
1It is interesting to note that Broda and Weinstein (2004) explored the Japanese government
deﬁcits in net values by integrating the general account and the social security account. In the
actual Japanese budget system, except a certain amount of transfers from a general government
account to a public pension account, the general government account and the public pension
account are separately ﬁnanced, and each budget is fundamentally independent. Especially,
the government would not be allowed to pay outstanding government debts back by using the
accumulated public pension fund without an agreement on ﬁscal consolidation of both accounts
in the Japanese society, and under the current budget system the discussion based on net values
would mislead us as to the evaluation of current as well as future government policies. Thus,
treatment of both accounts as an integrated one, or a discussion based on net values, would
not reﬂect the actual system. In this sense, gross values of outstanding government deﬁcits are
used(2).
This paper also diﬀers from Broda and Weinstein (2004) in the following important aspects:
This paper incorporates the optimal behavior of each agent within a intertemporal general
equilibrium framework, and thus, several channels to aﬀect key variables such as interest rates,
savings and GDP are taken into account. In particular the interest rate and GDP are both
endogenously determined through the optimal behavior of each agent.
On the future population, the latest version of Projection of Future Population in Japan
(Shourai-Jinko-Suikei 2002) has been used for the future demography in our simulation under
the assumption that fertility rates and mortality rates are both constant from 2100, and thus
the future population gradually converges to a new steady state.
Since the future population structure substantially aﬀects savings particularly at an aggre-
gated level, endogeneity of the interest rate in the capital market as well as GDP in the goods
market with the conventional aggregated production function is crucial. The interest rate is
endogenously determined in the capital market, where outstanding government bonds, a public
pension fund, and aggregated private savings are all taken into account consistently.
Endogeneity of GDP also plays an important role, since the rapid demographic change in the
(2)Although all discussions in this paper will be given based on gross values, the calculated net value of gov-
ernment deﬁcits in 2002 is around 60%, which is close to the value in Broda and Weinstein (2002). The main
reason why our simulation results are much more severe would come from diﬀerent assumptions on the diﬀerence
between the interest rate and the economic growth rate, particularly from their optimistic assumption on the
economic growth.
2future in Japan obviously aﬀects labor force and aggregated savings. The change in aggregated
savings aﬀects private capital in the capital market, and thus the endogeneity of the interest
rate and GDP can capture these eﬀects. Japan will not have experienced not only high and
rapid population aging but also a decrease in the total population in the future. If the future
government deﬁcits due to this unexperienced demographic change are anticipated, then the
optimal behavior of each agent in relevant markets should be considered in order to take into
account these eﬀects.
Technological progress of private production also plays a very important role. A 1% diﬀerence
in an annual rate of technological progress results in a substantial diﬀerence in future GDP as
pointed out by Kato (2002d). Kato (2002d) showed that an introduction of 0.5% dimishing
growth of technological progress for 40 years eventuated in a 8.4% increase in per capita income
in a new steady state, and also that 1.0% dimishing growth achieved a 18.3% increase in per
capita income. Since the diﬀerence between the interest rate and GDP obviously induces diﬀerent
evaluations of future deﬁcits policies, a very careful attention should be paid to the assumption
on technological progress. As will be described later, technological progress in Japan measured
by the Solow residual in the past two decades has been around zero %(3), and thus the value of
technological progress in our benchmark simulation is assumed to be zero. However, note also
that other cases of positive rates of technological progress in the future have been investigated,
since the diﬀerence in the assumption of technological progress does matter particularly in terms
of the diﬀerence in the gap between the interest rate and GDP. Although the zero assumption
on technical progress reﬂects the actual aspect for the last two decades, the assumption that
zero technological progress continues in the future as well might not be necessary. Thus, other
cases with 0.5% as well as 1.0% technological progress will also be explored.
A gap between the interest rate and the growth rate in this paper is much bigger than that in
Broda and Weinstein (2004), which results in diﬀerent results between in their optimistic paper
and in our pessimistic paper.
The results obtained in this paper are summarized as follows: One of the main results of this
paper is that the tax burden (GDP) ratio will increase up to about 36%, and the social security
(3)Our recalculaiton of the Solow residual does not take into account the eﬀect of public capital on technological
progress, and an inclusion of the eﬀect of public capital would obviously result in an upward shift of technological
progress. Kawade, Bessho and Kato (2005) and Kato (2002b, c, d) discuss the eﬀect of public capital on private
production.
3burden (GDP) ratio will increase up to 23.3% in 2050, even though the government tries to have
a positive primary balance by 2010. Note that all ratios presented in this paper are based on
GDP, and the above ﬁgures do not coincide with the actual ﬁgures, which are usually deﬁned
on national income. If our simulated values of the ratios are re-calculated based on national
income, the ratios become larger. However, the result that high burdens on future generations
cannot be avoided does not change, since the diﬀerence between the values in the conventional
deﬁnition and the values in our deﬁnition does not change the rapid increasing trend of the
ratios.
The national burden ratio to GDP, deﬁned by the sum of the tax burden (GDP) ratio and
the social security burden (GDP) ratio, will be around 59% in 2050 in the benchmark case.
This ﬁgure can also be shown in the conventional deﬁnition, the national income burden ratio.
The national income burden ratio is deﬁned as the ratio to national income, and it will have to
be around 80% in 2050. Our striking result is that if the government wants to have a positive
primary balance by 2010, then the future burden should be very high, implying that the current
ﬁnancial situation facing the Japanese government in terms of governments deﬁcits is very
dangerous. If the government postpones the timing to pay its deﬁcits back, then the situation
would be worse due to more interest payment incurred by the huge amount of outstanding
government debts.
Future high burdens can be explained by the reason why future GDP will decrease due to a
substantial decrease in labor force and forecasted zero technological progress, which was based
on the calculation of the Solow residual of the past two decades.
Another striking result is that future technological progress will result in more future tax
burdens, although an expansion of technological progress increases future GDP. In our simulation
an expansion of future technological progress results in an increase in the future equilibrium
interest rate, thus inducing an increase in the future consumption tax rate to ﬁnance more
interest payments incurred by government debts. The gaps between the interest rate and the
GDP growth rate become bigger rather than smaller.
An aging population will result in an increase in the total amount of the public pension
beneﬁts as well as the total amount of the public health insurance beneﬁts, even though the
amount of per capita beneﬁts are ﬁxed at the 2002 level in the future, if the current scheme is
4maintained. The ratio of public health insurance beneﬁts to GDP is expected to increase at 1
% every 10 years, and the ratio will be around 9.6% in 2050. The 2004 public pension reform
will successfully result in a 13 point decrease in the contribution rate from 36.44% to 23.53%,
and reduce the social security burden ratio to GDP by 8 points from 23.27% to 15.02% in 2050,
compared with the benchmark case.
This paper is organized as follows: The next section summarizes the sustainability problem,
and Section 3 presents the basic model employed in the simulation analysis. Section 4 shows
the data and parameters used in the simulation analysis, and Section 5 evaluates the simulation
results. Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2 Sustainability Problem
2.1 Largest Sustainable Debt
Japan is suﬀering from large government deﬁcits. This is largely due to a slowdown of economic
growth in recent years. When national income does not grow much, tax revenue will not increase
either. On the contrary, public spending and transfer payments have been gradually raised due to
political pressures of interest groups, resulting in large budget deﬁcits. The question of whether
Japan’s ﬁscal policy has been sustainable in the sense of being consistent with an intertemporal
budget constraint has long been concerned.
In order to explore theoretically the determinants of the largest amount of per capita debt
that is consistent with competitive equilibrium b∗, consider a simple pure-exchange two-period
overlapping generations economy with constant population, which is consistent with Ricardian
debt neutrality. The growth rate of population, n, is assumed to be zero. See Samuelson (1958)
and Azariadis (1993). The per-capita saving function of the younger generation s( ) is given by
s(rt+1)=bt, (1)
where r is the interest rate and b is per capita debt. It is assumed that savings are increasing
with the rate of interest. ∂s
∂r > 0. Then, from (1) we have
5rt+1 = r(bt), (2)
The government budget constraint at time t + 1 is given by
bt+1 =( 1+rt+1)bt + gt+1 − τt+1 (3)
where g is public spending and τ is tax revenues. The primary deﬁcit q is deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between g and τ. Suppose for simplicity q = 0. Then, substituting (2) into (3), we
get
bt+1 =[ 1+r(bt)]bt (4)
Figure 1 describes equation (4) in the (bt+1,b t) plane. We call this curve Φ curve. Equation
(4) has two stationary solutions. One of them is the origin, and the other equilibrium lies at
the intersection of the 45 degree line with the phase line of equation (4), Φ curve. Figure 1 (i)
is called the Samuelson case and Figure 1 (ii) is called the classical case.
Let us run a primary budget deﬁcit q0 = b0 > 0 per capita at the beginning of time and
preserve primary budget balance (qt = 0) thereafter. How big can initial debt be? Figure 1 (i)
shows that in the Samuelson case b0 cannot exceed s(n), the golden rule stock of per capita
public debt, which is associated with point A. Figure 1 (ii) shows that in the classical case b0
cannot exceed zero. Hence, the largest amount of per capita public debt that is consistent with
competitive equilibrium b∗ is either zero or s(n), whichever is greater. b∗ = Max[0,s(n)]. As
shown in Azariadis (1993), when the primary deﬁcit q increases, b∗ will be reduced.
If b0 >s(n), the interest rate needed to induce households voluntary to hold b0 would exceed
the growth rate n in each period. National debt would grow faster than the economy, with debt
service surpassing in ﬁnite time the maximal ﬂow of saving which the household sector is capable
of. The government debt will not be held by the household any more and the government goes
bankrupt.
62.2 Example





1 is the ﬁrst-period consumption of generation i and ci
2 is the second period con-
sumption of generation i. Endowment vector is (e1,e 2), where the second-period endowment e2
is smaller than the ﬁrst-period endowment e1.
Fiscal policy is (g,τ1,τ 2), where g is per capita government spending, τ1 is lump sum taxes
levied in the younger period, and τ2 is lump sum taxes levied in the older period. Assuming for
simplicity that the primary deﬁcit q is zero, the government budget constraint is given by
τ1 + τ2 = g (6)
Or
b2 =( 1+r2)b1 (7)
It is assumed that τ1 <e 1,g<e 2; and beginning-of-time national debt b0 is zero.










which implies a savings function of the form










Considering (7), the equilibrium sequence of national debt must then satisfy the equation




Stationary solutions are b =0a t1+r =
(e2−τ2)
(e1−τ1) and b =
[e1−τ1−(e2−τ2)]
2 at r = 0 The latter
7is an asymptotically unstable equilibrium if e1 − τ1 >e 2 − τ2








Equation (11) implies that b∗ is increasing with the ﬁrst-period disposable income (e1 − τ1)
and is decreasing with the second-period disposable income (e2 − τ2). An increase in τ1 with a
decrease in τ2 means an intergenerational transfer from young to old. Thus, from (11) we can
say that the higher the intergenerational transfer from young to old, the smaller the amount of
b∗.
Given public consumption g per capita, the largest sustainable value of public debt per capita
is attained if τ1 is as small as possible, that is, at τ1 =0 ,τ 2 = g. Then, the largest amount of
per capita deﬁcit is
b∗ =
e1 − e2 + g
2
which is positive when e1 + g>e 2.
2.3 Sustainability and Policy Implication
As shown in sections 2.1 and 2.2, the higher the primary surplus, the propensity to save, the
growth rate, or the intergenerational transfer from old to young, the more likely the sustainability
problem will be alleviated. Put diﬀerently, any of decreasing growth and saving or increasing
public spending and intergenerational transfer payments would contribute to an increase in the
primary deﬁcit, resulting to a higher pressure on the sustainability problem.
As explained in Ihori and Sato (2002), ﬁscal deﬁcits in 1980s have been reduced and its main
reasons were to cut public spending to a great extent in the ﬁrst half of 1980s and to collect
taxes in the second half of 1980s. In 1990s we have experienced a rapid increase in ﬁscal deﬁcits.
In 2000s we have seen that an increase in transfer payments (a decrease in net tax revenues) due
to aging contributes to higher primary deﬁcits. It is very important to restrain the increasing
trend in transfer payments.
There have been a few analyses on the sustainability problem in the government debt in
8Japan. So long as we use the data until 1990, it seems that the government debt has been
sustainable in Japan. However, as explained in Ihori and Sato (2002) among others, deﬁcits
have increased rapidly since 1990. We are not sure if the present ﬁscal system in Japan may be
sustainable in the long run.
Ihori, Nakazato, and Kawade (2002) attempted a standard approach to test the ﬁscal sus-
tainability condition, using the methodology of Hamilton and Flavin (1986). They conducted
the empirical analysis for the Japanese ﬁscal data from 1957 to 1999. To conduct the test, the
values for the nominal growth rate, n, and the nominal interest rate, r, must be speciﬁed. Their
strategy was to set various values for r − n and to check whether the results are sensitive to
the values chosen. The estimated results imply that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at a
5% signiﬁcance level, suggesting that government solvency was not a serious problem until FY
1996. On the contrary, the result for the period 1957-1997 rejects the null hypothesis when r−n
is above 0.05, and the results for the period 1957-1998 and the period 1957-1999 also reject the
null hypothesis when r − n is above 0.04.
Bohn (1998) showed that the positive response of the primary surplus to changes in debt in
the U. S. suggests that U. S. ﬁscal policy is satisfying an intertemporal budget constraint. Japan
has two serious points in terms of Bohn’s theoretical framework. First, the Japanese primary
surplus is apparently a decreasing function of the debt-GDP ration since 1990 and hence it does
not satisfy Bohn’s test. See Figure 2. Doi and Ihori (2003) showed that Japanese government
debt does not satisfy a transversality condition for FY 1965-2000.
These observations indicate that ﬁscal sustainability is a serious issue in Japan. The longer
the sample period, the more likely we face the ﬁscal crisis. First, the Japanese primary surplus is
apparently a decreasing function of the debt-GDP ratio since 1990 and hence it does not satisfy
Bohn’s test. Second, the rate of interest is greater than the growth rate in Japan in the 1990s.
It follows that further ﬁscal expansion of social security will cause the public debt crisis to occur
in the near future.
Japan has two serious diﬃculties in terms of sustainability. It is important to reduce the
government deﬁcit in the near future.
92.4 Path to ﬁscal consolidation
Japan must now move quickly to put its ﬁscal house in order. Government bonds now sell at
low interest despite the huge ﬁscal deﬁcit. This means that investors are optimistic about the
future of Japan’s ﬁscal system. They consider a collapse of public ﬁnance unlikely. Such investor
conﬁdence reﬂects the fact the overall tax burden as a percentage of national income remains
relatively low. Investors therefore believe that Japanese economy can withstand further tax
increases as is stressed by Broda and Weinstein (2004).
However, if the expansionary trend in government spending continues at this pace, the ﬁscal
deﬁcit will inﬂate further and the ability to raise taxes in the future will be politically limited.
Investors will lose conﬁdence in Japan’s public bonds if they believe that the nation’s public
ﬁnance is bound for long-term crisis. The result is that interest rates will rise and ﬁscal failure
will become a more tangible reality.
Another concern, assuming that the ﬁnancial system will be sustained, is what happens if a
considerable deﬁcit accumulates over an extended period of time. Public ﬁnance will not collapse
even if the debt load grows, unless the ratio of debt to GDP also increases. But if that debt ratio
rises, it would have a more restrictive impact upon private investment. Public borrowing - the
ﬁscal deﬁcit - would cut into private-sector savings and private investment would be restricted
by that much. If the money raised by borrowing is squandered on public works projects, private
investment would be restricted even more. Japan’s long-term economic prospects would dim
even more if growth is restricted, even if the deﬁcit is sustainable and a ﬁscal collapse is averted.
It is thus useful to promote ﬁscal reconstruction in two ways. The ﬁrst is by revamping the
ﬁscal system drastically. These changes are needed.
(1) Introduction of taxpayer-identiﬁcation numbering system and other useful measures to
correct horizontal inequalities in the tax burden
(2) Overhauling the project evaluation system to eliminate wasteful public works programs
(3) Streamlining the revenue-sharing system (the so-called local allocation tax) that is cre-
ating ”moral hazards” on the part of local governments
(4) Streamlining the ”pay as you go” pension and health insurance system that now taps
contributions by the young to pay the elderly and thus is spreading a sense of mistrust among
young contributors.
10At the current Koizumi administration, seeking to enhance both eﬃciency and transparency,
the eﬀorts to reduce costs and to utilize cost-beneﬁt analysis have been complemented by a new
re-assessment system. These changes are desirable but the speed of structural reform is not so
high. Conﬁdence in future ﬁscal management should be enhanced by implementing these and
other structural reforms intensively in the next three years or so. Further determined eﬀorts
are needed to reform public spending and taxation in a more eﬃcient way. It should be noted
that a successful outcome of ﬁscal reconstruction may increase overall political support for the
drastic ﬁscal reforms.
The other way to promote ﬁscal reform is to reduce the massive deﬁcit. Needless to say, it is
not rational to give top priority to deﬁcit reduction alone. Even so, deﬁcit reduction is still an
important policy objective, given the nation’s deteriorating ﬁscal health. The question is how
long it should take to cut the deﬁcit. Considering the problems that could arise from delays,
a reduction program should be implemented as soon as possible, just as reform of the system.
We now consider the long-run macroeconomic eﬀects of deﬁcit reduction, using a computational
overlapping generations model.
3 The Model
In the following simulation section, the model employs a multi-period overlapping generations
model developed by Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1983). Taxes, a public pension scheme, and a
public health insurance scheme are also incorporated into the basic model, in order to reﬂect
the existing Japanese system. An economy of the model consists of the household, the ﬁrm, and
the government sector, where there is only one good considered for simplicity.
The household is assumed to optimize its intertemporal consumption through its lifetime,
taking the wage rate, the interest rate, and its own survival rates as given. The tax system, the
public pension scheme, and the public health insurance scheme are also assumed to be taken
as given by the household. The household is assumed to obtain its wage by supplying its labor
inelastically until it retires, and once it retires it never returns to the labor market. There are
no altruistic bequest motives and Ricardian equivalence does not hold.
The ﬁrm is assumed to maximize its proﬁt, taking the wage rate and the interest rate as
given. The wage rate and the interest rate are determined in each factor market with their
11equilibrium condition.
The government sector is assumed to collect taxes from the household, and also to issue
government bonds in order to ﬁnance its consumption and its transfers to a social security
system. The government sector is also assumed to run a pay-as-you-go public pension scheme
and a public health insurance scheme. The government is also assumed to accumulate a public
pension fund out of the contribution collected from working generations. This assumption
reﬂects the existing Japanese public pension scheme.
It is assumed that there is no private life insurance, and thus there is no mechanism for the
household to hedge its risk in terms of a possibility to die in each period. Since the household
is assumed to have no bequest motives, this assumption implies that the household leaves an
accidental bequest in each period when it dies. However, it is also assumed that there is no
uncertainty in the whole economy in terms of an population of each generation, and thus there
is no uncertainty in the total (aggregate) amount of bequests inherited in each period.
3.1 The Household
The household appears in the economy at age 20 as a decision maker. Although the household
faces uncertainty to die in each period, it dies with certainty at the end of 99 years old if it keeps
surviving until 99 years old. Denoting the conditional survival rate of j +20-age-old generation





The survival risk is assumed to be idiosyncratic, and there is no uncertainty in the aggregate
population in each period. Each qi,j+1,j is calculated from the life table in Population Projections
for Japan:2001-2050 by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.
The household is assumed to maximize its expected lifetime utility with respect to its own





where ci,s is consumption at age s, and δ is the time discount rate. U(ci,s;mi,s), the instantaneous





where ρ is the index of relative risk aversion. mi,s represents a subsistence level of consumption
at age s, and it is the minimum level of consumption at which the household can be ”healthy”
in the sense that it can only enjoy its consumption over mi,s. The net amount of consumption
over mi,s only gives utility to the household. Consumption of medical services is not considered
explicitly in this paper, but mi,s can be interpreted as the amount of medical expenditure
measured in consumption goods to be spent in order for the household to be healthy at each
age(5). Note also that the household only chooses its consumption, taking mi,s as given, but mi,s
diﬀers according to its age by reﬂecting the fact that it would be more expensive to be healthy
as aged.
The budget constraint of the s-year-old household of generation i at time t is given by
ai,s+1 = [ 1+( 1− τr,t)rt]ai,s +( 1− τy,t − τp,t)wtei,s + bi,s
+ psi,s +( 1− cpi,s)mi,s − (1 + τc,t)ci,s, (13)
where ai,s denotes the initial level of its assets of generation i at period t, rt denotes the interest
(4)According to the result by Hayashi (1995), bequest motives are not considered in this paper. Strategic bequest
motives (Bernheim et al. 1985) are also not considered. Since there is no uncertainty in wage income in this
paper, a precautionary saving motive for uncertain wage ﬂuctuation is not considered, which was discussed in
Horioka and Watanabe (1997).
(5)Some studies consider the direct incorporation of the amount of medical services or of the health stock
into utility as a control variable in the OLG models (Johansson 2000, Bednarek and Pecchenino 2002). In this
paper, however, as expressed in (12) , the amount of medical expenditure has simply been introduced as an
exogenous variable in order to avoid to have simulation resutls misleadingly, since it seems that there has been no
consensus yet in the literature regarding the functional form of utility or the values of key parameters. Although
a considerable number of empirical studies have been made on “price elasticity” (e.g., Manning et al. 1987),
and relationships between aggregate medical expenditure and GDP (e.g., Gerdtham and Lothgren 2000), the
simpliest assumption on the treatment of medical expenditure in the utility function has been made in this paper,
particularly in order to rule out ad hoc results in the simulation analysis.
13rate, and ei,s denotes the measure of eﬀective labor. Eﬀective labor diﬀers according to s, its
age, which is equal to t−i(6). The household supplies labor inelastically for simplicity. wt is the
wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor, and wtei,s is pre-tax labor income. All taxes considered
in this paper are proportional. τy,t, τr,t, and τc,t denote the wage income tax rate, the interest
income tax rate, and the consumption tax rate, respectively. The contribution rate to a social
security system is denoted by τp,t. The social security system consists of a public pension scheme
as well as a public medical health scheme, and the total contribution collected is divided into
the two schemes. psi,s and (1 − cpi,s)mi,s represent public pension beneﬁts and public medical
insurance beneﬁts, respectively.
The values of both beneﬁts in the simulation are given based on calculated data from actual
data. cps,t is the self-payment rate of the public health insurance, and the value of it in the
simulation is set in order to reﬂect real aspects. An ex-post moral hazard problem of medical
insurance is not considered in this paper explicitly. Denoting the age when the household starts






βpHt if t − i ≥ R
0i f t − i<R
, (14)







where R + 20 denotes the household’s retirement age. It is assumed that the household con-
tributes to a public pension scheme from age 20 to age 64. It is assumed that there is no private
pension market(7).
The amount of medical expenditure measured in consumption goods, represented by mi,s,
depends on age s and period t, and it is given exogenously in this paper. As pointed out by
several papers (e.g., Reinhardt 2000), the amount of real per capita health expenditure plotted
(6)The proﬁle of eﬀective labor follows Kato (2002a).
(7)See Iwamoto et al. (1991, 1993) or Friedman and Warshawsky (1988, 1990) formodels which include the
private pension market.
14by age shows a U-shaped pattern, and mi,s is assumed to be U-shaped in this paper. Thus, the
total amount of public medical insurance beneﬁts increases as an economy becomes aged. As
assumed in (13), the public medical insurance beneﬁts to keep the household healthy is given in
the form of money in this paper.
The total amount of savings of the household which dies is left as an accidental bequest, and
the accidental bequest is assumed to be redistributed to the household which survives in period
t, which is denoted by bi,s. It is assumed through this paper that the household in all generations
which survives obtains the equal amount of the accidental bequest in each period(8).







from which the optimal consumption path can be derived once the initial value of the household’s
consumption is given.
Note that the liquidity constraint is not taken into account in this paper. Thus, the household
can borrow when it is relatively young. As will be studied later, a decrease in its disposal
wage income due to an increase in the contributions to the social security scheme makes the
household have negative savings at its relatively early lifetime stage. In reality there are several
opportunities to borrow money, and the liquidity constraint is not taken into account in this
paper.
3.2 The Firm
The ﬁrm is assumed to maximize its proﬁt, taking the wage rate and the interest rate as given.
The wage rate and the interest rate are determined in the perfectly competitive factor markets





(8)Kato (2002a) assumed that only the generation of age 65 in each period received bequests. Atoda and Kato
(1993) discussed the timing of receiving bequests.
15where Yt represents aggregate output at time t, Kt the aggregate private capital stock, Lt aggre-
gate labor supply measured by eﬀective labor unit. Aproc,t represents technology of production
of the private sector. Assuming that each factor market is perfectly competitive with the above





rt =( 1 − α)Aproc,tLα
t K−α
t − δk, (17b)










3.3 The Government Sector
The government sector consists of a general account and a social security account.
Expenditure of the general account includes general government expenditure and transfers
to a public pension account. The expenditure of the general account is ﬁnanced by taxation and
issuing government bonds. The general government expenditure includes government consump-
tion, government investment, interest payment incurred by government debts, and transfers to
the household. Note that these transfers to the household is diﬀerent from the transfers to the
public pension account.
The social security account consists of a public pension account and a public health insurance
account. The amount of transfers to the public pension account from the general account is
characterized by ηt, which is the ratio of the amount of transfers to the total amount of social
security beneﬁts. The government sector is assumed to have no particular objective function
which it maximizes.
16The budget constraint of the general account is
GEt = GRt + TG BONDt − (1 + rt)BONDt−1 (18a)
CGt = rCG,t · Y (18b)
IGt = GEt − (CGt + ηtBt) (18c)
GRt = τc,tCt + τy,twLt + τr,trtKt + τh,tBQt (18d)
where BONDt,G R t, and GEt denote the amount of outstanding government bonds, the total
tax revenue, and the total general government expenditure, respectively. TG BONDt is the
target level of outstanding governmental bonds. Transfers to the public pension account are
denoted by ηtBt, where Bt is the total social security beneﬁts. τr,t, τy,t, τc,t, and τh,t denote
the capital income tax rate, the labor income tax rate, the consumption tax rate, and the
inheritance tax rate, respectively. In the following simulations only the consumption tax rate
is endogenously determined to ﬁnance the future government policy, and all other tax rates are
exogenously ﬁxed at the 2002 values even after 2002. CGt denotes government consumption.
The amount of bequests is represented by BQt, and Kt is the private capital stock.
The social security account consists of the public pension account and the public health
insurance account. The budget constraint of the social security account and the contribution
rate are deﬁned as
F∗
t+1 =( 1 + rt)Ft + Pt − (1 − ηt)Bt (19)
τp,t =
F∗
t+1 − (1 − ηt)Bt − (1 + rt)Ft
wtLt
, (20)
where Ft is an accumulated public pension fund at the end of period t. Bt and Pt denote
the total amount of beneﬁts and the total amount of the contributions. The total amount of
beneﬁts includes the public pension beneﬁts and the public medical insurance beneﬁts. The
contribution rate is determined endogenously in order to satisfy (20) with the target level of the
public pension fund, F∗
t+1, which is given exogenously in each scenario.
173.4 Market Equilibrium
The equilibrium condition of the capital market in period t is that the total amount of savings
of the household (At) plus the total amount of the public pension fund (Ft) are equal to the
private capital stock plus the total amount of outstanding government bonds such that
At + Ft = Kt + BONDt.
The equilibrium condition of the goods market is that aggregate output is equal to the sum of
private consumption (Ct), private investment (Kt+1 − (1 − δk)Kt) and government expenditure
(GEt), which is
Yt = Ct +( Kt+1 − (1 − δk)Kt)+GEt.
4 Data and Assumptions
The purpose of this paper is to examine the long-run macroeconomic eﬀects of future demo-
graphic change and the government debt policy numerically, particularly by taking into account
the existing public pension scheme and national medical expenditure through the existing public
health insurance.
In this paper, in order to make our simulation analysis as close to real circumstances as
possible, obtainable actual as well as forecasted data has been used with estimated values of
relevant parameters from the empirical research. The key elements relevant to this simulation
are the following ﬁve aspects; demography, government deﬁcits policy, a public pension scheme,
a medical health insurance scheme, and taxes.
4.1 Demography
Actual data has been used from 1965 to 2000. Before 1965 population data was calculated
backward from the 1965 population data under the assumption that the fertility rate and the
mortality rate are the same as those of 1965. Regarding the future population data, the latest
version of Projection of Future Population in Japan (Shourai-Jinko-Suikei 2002) has been used
in our simulation. Life table (Kanzen-Seimeihyo) and Shourai-Jinko-Suikei 2002 were used
18for obtaining survival rates. Since Projection of Future Population in Japan (Shourai-Jinko-
Suikei 2002) gives estimates of the future population only until 2100, it has been assumed in our
simulation that the number of births and deaths, and the survival rates after 2100 are ﬁxed at the
same levels as those in 2100. Figure 3 shows demographic changes based on 3 diﬀerent scenarios
in Projection of Future Population in Japan (Shourai-Jinko-Suikei 2002). In our benchmark
simulation its medium variant estimation has been used.
4.2 Government Deﬁcits
Until 2002 actual data from SNA has been used in our simulations. From 2003 the future govern-
ment debts has been given based on the following assumptions: the growth rate of outstanding
governments debts keeps decreasing by 0.5% from 6.57%, the actual growth rate of the ratio of
outstanding government debts to GDP in 2002, until 2013. From 2014 the growth rate keeps
decreasing but by 0.1% until 2023. Then the ratio of outstanding governments debts to GDP
(the GDP ratio) has been assumed to be constant from 2024. Under these assumptions the ratio
converges to a new steady state level, which is 176% in the benchmark case as shown in Table
1. Note that the actual gross level of the GDP ratio in 2002 is 114.30%. Other 2 more cases
regarding the GDP ratios will be discussed later.
4.3 Social Security System
The social security system in this paper consists of two schemes; the public pension scheme and
the public health insurance scheme.
The actual data has been used until 2002 for both the public pension scheme and the public
health insurance. In terms of the contribution rate, the actual data has also been used until
2002. From 2003, the total amount contributed to the social security has been assumed to be
used to ﬁnance both schemes. In the actual system the public pension contribution (the long
term contribution) and the public health insurance contribution( the short term contribution)
are typically collected together as the social insurance contribution. The contribution rate has
been assumed in order to satisfy (20), where the target level of the pension fund is exogenously
given.
βp, the replacement rate, was calculated from SNA, and the actual values have been given
19until 2002. From 2003 the ratio has been assumed to be ﬁxed at the same rate of that in 2002,
which is 54%.
An aging population aﬀects the endogenous determination of the contribution rate through
two channels: One is through the pay-as-you-go public pension scheme. The amount of per
capita beneﬁts is determined with (14) and (15), and if the current scheme does not change in
the future, then an aging population should increase the contribution rate in order to maintain
the same amount of per capita beneﬁts in the future. Another channel is through the public
health insurance. mi,s, medical expenditure, has been assumed to be U-shaped in this paper.
Thus, even though the shape, thus a medical expenditure pattern, will not change in the future,
an aging population increases medical expenditure through an increase in the relative number
of an aged population, which is more expensive than other populations. Figure 4 shows actual
and simulated data of social security burden (GDP) ratios
4.3.1 Public Pension Scheme
The public pension scheme has been assumed to be maintained at the same level as that of 2002
in a benchmark case in a sense that it provides the same amount of per capita beneﬁts in the
future. The actual data has been used in our simulations until 2002. In terms of the amount
of a public pension fund, actual data has been used until 2002. From 2003 the amount of the
fund has been assumed to be ﬁxed at the same level of that of 2002 in the benchmark case.
Furthermore, the eﬀect of the public pension reform of year 2004 has been investigated. The
detailed explanation of the reform will be given later. The calculated future contribution rate
and public pension beneﬁts are given in Table 1.
4.3.2 Public Health Insurance
The actual data has been used until 2002. Based on National Medical Expenditure by Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare, SNA data was modiﬁed. The modiﬁcation gives per capita public
health insurance beneﬁts at each age. Until 2002 the actual per capita beneﬁts at each age were
calculated, which show a U shaped proﬁle on age. From 2003 it has been assumed that the U
shaped pattern does not change. This implies that mi,s changes with s but not with i from
2003. However, due to an aging population, the ratio of the public health insurance beneﬁts to
20GDP increases gradually as shown in Table 1.
4.4 Taxes
Except for a consumption tax, all other taxes (a labor income tax, an interest income tax, and
an inheritance tax) have been assumed to be ﬁxed at the 2002 levels even after 2002. The 2002
levels of tax rates were obtained from the actual SNA data. Note that the consumption tax
is only the indirect tax in this paper, and its rate has been calculated in order to coincide the
calculated total amount of indirect tax revenue with the actual total amount of indirect taxes
revenue in SNA. Thus, the consumption tax rate calculated in this paper does not coincide with
the actual rate. The total amount of the consumption tax revenue in this paper corresponds
to the actual total amount of indirect taxes revenue in SNA. Figure 4 also shows actual and
simulated data of tax burden (GDP) ratios.
4.5 Technological Progress
Technological progress of private production plays a very important role. As has mentioned, a
1% diﬀerence in an annual rate of technological progress results in a substantial diﬀerence in
future GDP. Thus, a very careful attention should be paid to the assumption on technological
progress.
In this paper technological progress was calculated by the Solow Residual. According to
Hayashi and Prescott (2002), 0.361585 was given to a capital coeﬃcient in the estimation. The
calculated values of technological progress is given in Figure 5. Average values between 1993
and 2002 and between 1983 and 1992 are -0.5% and 0.1%, respectively. Thus, in our benchmark
simulations the future value of technological progress from 2003 is assumed to be zero in order to
reﬂect reality of the last two decades. Note that these estimated values were however obtained
based on the assumption that public capital did not aﬀect any private production. If we took
into account a positive eﬀect of public capital, then these ﬁgures might be bigger. Thus, other
cases with positive technological progress are also explored as extended cases in Section 5.4 The
assumption that zero technological progress also continues in the future as well might be too
strong. Section 5.4 investigates the eﬀect of the diﬀerence in technological progress in comparison
with the zero technological progress, where a 0.5% and a 1% increase in annual technological
21progress in private production are assumed to occur. Note that the zero technological progress
assumption is maintained until Section 5.4.
The values of parameters have been obtained from existing empirical research(9). The values
used in this paper are summarized as follows:
The Values of Parameters
δρ α δ k βp η (10)
-0.01 2.5 0.63842 0.089 0.5 0.2776
5 Simulation Analysis
5.1 Benchmark Simulation
In case of the benchmark simulation, the government deﬁcits has been assumed to converge to
a 176 % level in a new steady state. The public pension fund has been assumed to converge to a
42.1 % level. Per capita public pension beneﬁts and per capita medical insurance beneﬁts have
been assumed to be ﬁxed at the 2002 level. The consumption tax rate is determined endogenously
to satisfy the budget constraint of the general government account, and the contribution rate is
determined endogenously to satisfy the budget constraint of the social security account, which
consists of the public pension scheme and the public health insurance scheme.
Note that the total amount of the public pension beneﬁts and the total amount of the public
health insurance beneﬁts change due to the demographic change even though per capita beneﬁts
are ﬁxed at the 2002 level. GDP also changes endogenously, and thus, the ratios to GDP change
as shown in Table 1.
Outstanding diﬀerences from Broda and Weinstein (2004) can be found in GDP growth rates
and in interest rates in Table 1. They assumed several rate gaps from 0 to 4 % between the
interest rate and the GDP growth rate(11). Note that in their paper the GDP growth rates were
assumed to be positive. However the GDP growth rate in our paper will be negative from a
certain time in the future. Thus, in our paper the rate gaps between the interest rate and the
GDP growth rate can be bigger than 4% as shown in the last column of Table 1.
(9)See Uemura (2002) for detailed discussions.
(11)The rate gap is the interest rate minus the nominal GDP growth rate.
22As shown in Table 1,the GDP growth rate becomes negative from 2015 due to two reasons:
A rapid decrease in labor force and the zero rate of technological progress. Table 1 also shows
the diﬀerence between the GDP growth rate and the interest rate in the last column.
Tax burdens will increase near to 36% in 2050 due to a big gap between the GDP growth
rate and the interest rate. The big gap results in high tax burdens to ﬁnance interest payments
incurred by outstanding governments debts, even though the government tries to make the
primary balance positive from 2010. Note that the simulated value in 2002 is slightly higher
than the actual value. This is because the primary balance in the benchmark simulation is
assumed to be made positive at an earlier stage compared to the actual situation. In the
benchmark case it has been assumed that the primary balance will be positive by 2010, and the
diﬀerence in the value of the tax burden ratio between the actual one and the simulated one can
be explained as the situation that it would be diﬃcult to achieve a positive primary balance by
2010 with the current tax level.
The increasing trend in the ratio of public pension beneﬁts to GDP as well as in the ratio
of public health insurance beneﬁts to GDP can be explained by an aging population as has
been pointed out by several papers (Takayama and Kitamura (1999), Dekle (2002), Broda and
Weinstein (2002)). The social security burden ratio will increase up to 23.27% in 2050 if the
current system is maintained.
The result of the increasing trend in the public health insurance beneﬁts also supports
existing empirical research. As has been estimated in empirical research, public health insurance
beneﬁts are expected to increase at 1 % every 10 years, and the ratio of public health insurance
beneﬁts to GDP will be around 9.6% in 2050.
This ﬁgure can also be shown in the conventional deﬁnition, the national income burden
ratio. The national income burden ratio is deﬁned as the ratio to national income, and it will
have to be around 80% in 2050. Our striking result is that if the government wants to have
a positive primary balance by 2010, then the future burden should be very high, implying
that the current ﬁnancial situation facing the Japanese government in terms of governments
deﬁcits is very dangerous. If the government postpones the timing to pay its deﬁcits back, then
the situation would be worse due to more interest payment incurred by the huge amount of
outstanding government debts. If the government targets a 50% level of the national burden
23ratio, then our result can predict when it reaches. If the future burden is measured in the ratio
to national income, then in 2009 the national income burden ratio will become 50.39%. If it is
measured in our deﬁnition, then the national burden (GDP) ratio will become over 50% in 2030.
Due to the big gap between the GDP growth rate and the interest rate, and an aging popu-
lation, the national burden (GDP) ratio, which is deﬁned by the tax burden (GDP) ratio plus
the social security burden (GDP) ratio, will increase to around 59% in 2050 in this benchmark
case.
The result of high burdens in the future can further be described along the model: In terms
of distortion by taxation and the public pension scheme, an increase in the contribution rate
does not generate distortion in labor supply due to an exogenous assumption of labor supply.
However, an increase in the contribution rate results in a decrease in disposal income. Thus,
a rapid increase in the future contribution rate gives more burdens to future generations under
the current modiﬁed pay-as-you-go public pension scheme, and future generation will be worse
oﬀ by the increase in the contribution rate.
An increase in the consumption tax rate in the future makes future goods relatively more
expensive, and generates distortion in a lifetime consumption path. This also generates distortion
in savings, resulting in distortion in the capital market as well. If the increase in the consumption
tax rate induces an increase (a decrease) in private savings, then the increase in the consumption
tax to ﬁnance interest payments incurred by outstanding government debts result in higher
(lower) GDP in the future, and thus future generation will be better (worse) oﬀ. Furthermore
an increase in interest payments incurred by outstanding government debts implies an increase
in interest income, and an increase in the consumption tax does necessarily result in a decrease
in disposal income.
The increase in the consumption tax and the increase in the contribution rate deﬁnitely
change a path of lifetime savings, and thus all key parameters such as the interest rate in
the capital market. All these eﬀects ﬁnally aﬀects future GDP. Furthermore, particularly in
the transition to an aging population, a relative diﬀerence in the total amount of tax as well
as pension burdens exists among diﬀerent generations. Thus, intergenerational redistribution
through the current tax and the public pension scheme should be evaluated based on utility of
diﬀerent generations. This evaluation on utility of diﬀerent generations has been explored by
24comparing the benchmark case with the following extended cases.
5.2 Extension
Simulation results obviously depend on several assumptions, particularly assumption on the
future outstanding government debts and the future population structure. In this paper diﬀerent
scenarios have been explored as follows.
5.2.1 Outstanding Government Debts
Two diﬀerent scenarios in terms of future outstanding government debts have been studied. The
benchmark case and two diﬀerent scenarios (”high”and ”low”) can be shown in Figure6. The
”high” debts scenario would correspond to the current situation in a sense that it seems quite
diﬃcult to have a positive primary balance soon. In the ”high” debts scenario, the primary
balance does not become positive until 2022, and thus outstanding government debts ratio in
a gross value becomes 450% in the ﬁnal steady state. On the other hand, in the ”low” debts
scenario, outstanding government debts are paid back at a relatively early stage as shown in
Figure 6. In the ”low” debts scenario, the primary balance becomes positive in 2006, and thus
the ﬁnal level of outstanding government debts ratio in a steady state is 150%. Depending on
the timing of the primary balance being positive, the ﬁnal levels of outstanding government
debts ratio in a steady state diﬀer. The eﬀects of the diﬀerence in future government debts
policies on key parameters are summarized in from Table 2 to Table 6. In each table, 3rd and
4th columns show the eﬀects of the diﬀerence in outstanding government debts policies. 2nd
column shows the benchmark case. The comparison of the benchmark case with ”high” and
”low” debt policies gives results.
Apparently, in the ”high” debts policy the future tax burden ratio is higher than the bench-
mark case, and the tax burden ratio will increase over 50% in the ”high” debts policy. In the
”low” debts policy, the tax burden ratio is higher than the benchmark case until around 2020,
but the lowest tax burden ratio can be achieved eventually.
Welfare Comparison
Table 7 shows the welfare comparison of two diﬀerent policies with the benchmark case. 2nd
and 3rd columns give results. Note that the year corresponds to the year when a generation
25becomes 20 year old, and for instance year 2002 means the welfare of the generation which
becomes 20 year old in year 2002. A positive (negative) number implies that the generation
does (does not) prefer the policy to the benchmark case. As Table 7 shows, the ”high” debts
policy is not preferable for future generations, since the policy postpones the burdens to future
generations. On the other hand, the ”low” debts policy is not preferable for current generations,
since the current generations have to pay the burden by paying relatively high tax.
5.2.2 Diﬀerence in Future Demography
The latest version of Projection of Future Population in Japan (Shourai-Jinko-Suikei 2002)
presents three diﬀerent scenarios (low, medium and high variant estimations) regarding the
future population as shown in Figure 3. In the benchmark simulation the medium variant
estimation has been used. Table 2 - 6 show the eﬀect of diﬀerent future populations on relevant
variables. As can be expected, the eﬀect of a diﬀerence in the future populations appears in the
contribution rate and the social security burden ratio.
Welfare Comparison
Table 7 shows the eﬀect of the demographic diﬀerence on utility. 4th and 5th columns
show the comparison with the benchmark case. Since there are less people in the row variant
estimation, the contribution rate and thus the social security burden ratio are higher than those
in the benchmark case (medium variant estimation). If a future population is lower than the
benchmark case, then the demographic diﬀerence negatively aﬀects utility as shown in Table 7.
5.3 Public Pension Reform
As can be seen in Table 1 - 5, a future increase in the contribution rate as well as in the amount
of public pension beneﬁts cannot be avoided due to a rapid aging population if the current
system is maintained. In 2004 the public pension scheme was reformed, and the main feature
of the reform is to try to maintain the total level of the contribution rate in an aging Japan.
In the reform, the following points have been agreed on: In stead of maintaining the amount
of future beneﬁts, the amount of future contributions is maintained. Actually the contribution
rate will be increased until 2017 in order to ﬁnance an increase in the total beneﬁts due to an
aging population, but after 2017 the contribution rate is ﬁxed at the 2017 level, and the amount
26of total beneﬁts will be adjusted in order to ﬁnance an increasing amount of total beneﬁts. In
our simulation the amount of per capita beneﬁts has been assumed to be ﬁxed at the 2002
level in the future, but the total level of beneﬁts increases as Japan becomes aged. In order to
investigate the eﬀect of the reform, βp, the replacement rate, was chosen as a control variable to
maintain the future level of the contribution rate. In other words, βpwas carefully chosen so that
the endogenously determined values of the contribution rate follows the actual values designed
in the reform. The eﬀect of the reform is given in the last column in from Table 2 to Table
6. The comparison can be given with the second column (base) of each table. For example,
the eﬀect of the reform on the social security burden ratio can be explored by comparing the
second column with the last column of Table 5. As shown in Table 5, in 2050 the reform will
successfully reduce the social security burden ratio from 23.27% to 15.02%.
Welfare Comparison
The eﬀect of the reform evaluated in welfare is given in Table 7. The last column gives
the comparison with the benchmark case. The benchmark case corresponds to the policy in
which the current system is maintained. The 2004 reform tries to reduce the burdens on future
generations through the public pension scheme, and its eﬀect is shown in this table. As Table 7
shows, the reform is more preferable by more future generations.
5.4 Positive Technological Progress(12)
Diﬀerent assumptions on future technological progress induce diﬀerent results. Kato (2002d)
showed that an introduction of 0.5% dimishing growth of technological progress for 40 years
eventuated in a 8.4% increase in per capita income in a new steady state, and also that 1.0%
dimishing growth achieved a 18.3% increase in per capita income.
It has been assumed so far that technological progress in the future is ﬁxed at a zero rate.
However, the diﬀerence in the assumption of technological progress does matter particularly in
terms of the diﬀerence in the gap between the interest rate and GDP. Thus, although the zero
assumption on technical progress reﬂects the actual aspect for the last two decades, other two
cases with 0.5% as well as 1.0% technological progress are worth being investigated in comparison
with the zero technological progress case, in order to explore how much diﬀerent assumptions
(12)This section has been added to an earlier version based on detailed comments by Robert Dekle, David
Weinstein, and Takatoshi Ito. We would like to thank them for their valuable comments.
27regarding technological progress change simulation results.
Another assumption is introduced in this section regarding the future growth rate of medi-
cal expenditure: The actual data shows that annual growth rates of medical expenditure of all
cohorts except a cohort between age 0 and 14 are between 0.7% and 0.9%(13), and thus it is
assumed in both cases (0.5% and 1% technological progress cases) that medical expenditure in-
creases at 1% annually in the future. Furthermore, in order to distinguish the eﬀect of increasing
medical expenditure from the eﬀect of technological progress, another case is investigated, where
technological progress increases at a 1% rate with a zero growth rate of medical expenditure.
Table 8 and 9 show the eﬀects of the diﬀerence in future technological progress. The com-
parison of Table 1 with Table 8 and 9 highlights the eﬀects of the diﬀerence in technological
progress. As shown in Table 8 and 9, the GDP growth rate is higher as technological progress
is higher. Compared to the benchmark case with zero technological progress, which is shown in
Table 1, the GDP growth rate would not be negative until year 2040 when technological progress
increases at 1% annually, which is intuitively plausible.
A striking result is that the interest rate is higher as technological progress is higher. The
equilibrium interest rate is determined in the capital market through the interaction between
demand and supply, and this result can be explained with the following four reasons: The
ﬁrst reason is the eﬀect on the demand side. An increase in technological progress shifts the
production function upward, resulting in an increase in demand for private capital. This implies
an upward shift of the demand curve in the capital market, inducing an increase in the interest
rate.
Other three reasons are the eﬀects on the supply side. The second reason is the eﬀect of
an expansion of technological progress on income. The increase in income generates a positive
income eﬀect, but it does not determine whether or not private savings are stimulated either
if goods are normal with the utility function speciﬁed in our paper. As long as both current
and future consumption are normal goods, the income eﬀect does not determine whether or not
private savings increase.
The third reason is the eﬀect on the relative price. Since an increase in the interest rate
implies a decrease in the relative price of future consumption, it stimulates private savings
(13)The annual growth rate of medical expenditure of the cohort between age 0 and 14 is 4.3%.
28through the substitution eﬀect.
The fourth reason is related to the third one in a sense that it aﬀects the relative price. An
increase in the interest rate results in more interest payments incurred by government debts. This
implies an increase in a future consumption tax rate. Since the increase in a future consumption
tax rate implies an increase in the relative price of future consumption, the increase in the tax
rate results in a decrease in private savings through the substitution eﬀect. Thus, an expansion
of future technological progress aﬀects both the supply and the demand sides of the capital
market in a complicated way. In particular, the overall eﬀect on the supply side cannot be
determined, depending on the above mentioned channels. In our simulations, an expansion of
future technological progress results in an increase in the interest rate. Due to the increase in
the interest rate, although the expansion of technological progress also induces an increase in
the GDP growth rate, the gaps between the interest rate and the GDP growth rate become
bigger rather than smaller, as shown in the last column of Table 8 and 9.
In addition, due to an increase in the equilibrium interest rate, the amount of interest
payments incurred by government debts increases, thus eventuating in an increase in future tax
burdens, which is shown in 4th column in Table 8 and 9. However, the eﬀect on the social
security system is diﬀerent. There are two eﬀects: On one hand, since βp, the replacement rate,
is assumed to be constant, an increase in future GDP thus future income by an expansion of
technological progress results in an increase in the amount of pension beneﬁts after retirement.
This eﬀect increases the contribution rate of the social security system. On the other hand, an
increase in future GDP also has an eﬀect to reduce the contribution rate, since the contribution
rate is determined endogenously based on the ratio of the total amount of the aggregated pension
beneﬁts to GDP. Table 8 shows that the former eﬀect is stronger than the latter eﬀect when
technological progress grows at 0.5%, but a 1.0% increase in technological progress is large
enough in a sense that future contribution rates can be maintained at lower levels, as shown in
Table 9. Our simulation result shows that not only an expansion of future technological progress
results in more tax burdens in the future, but also an insuﬃcient expansion of technological
progress results in more burdens in the social security system as well.
Table 10 shows the eﬀect of the diﬀerence in future medical expenditure. The comparison of
Table 9 with Table 10 explores the eﬀect of the diﬀerence in future medical expenditure. Lower
29medical expenditure in the future obviously results in the lower contribution rate in the future,
resulting in an increase in future disposal income. The increase in the future disposal income
weakens an incentive to save for future consumption, and it reduces the amount of aggregated
savings. The decrease in the savings results in an increase in the interest rate, as shown in Table
10, and future tax rates must increase to ﬁnance more interest payments, although medical
expenditure is lower in the future. Thus, as shown in Table 10, future tax burden ratios are
relatively higher, even though future contribution rates are lower.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the eﬀects of the demographic change and the government debt policy
in Japan on economic growth and economic welfare, particularly by taking into account the
existing public pension scheme as well as national medical expenditure through the existing
public health insurance, where a computational overlapping generations model is used within a
general equilibrium context.
One of the main results of this paper is that the tax burden (GDP) ratio will increase up to
about 36%, and the social security burden (GDP) ratio will increase up to 23.3% in 2050, even
though the government tries to have a positive primary balance by 2010.
The national burden ratio to GDP, deﬁned by the sum of the tax burden (GDP) ratio and
the social security burden (GDP) ratio, will be around 59% in 2050 in the benchmark case.
This ﬁgure can also be shown in the conventional deﬁnition, the national income burden ratio.
The national income burden ratio is deﬁned as the ratio to national income, and it will have to
be around 80% in 2050. Our striking result is that if the government wants to have a positive
primary balance by 2010, then the future burden should be very high, implying that the current
ﬁnancial situation facing the Japanese government in terms of governments deﬁcits is very
dangerous. If the government postpones the timing to pay its deﬁcits back, then the situation
would be worse due to more interest payment incurred by the huge amount of outstanding
government debts.
An aging population will result in an increase in the total amount of the public pension
beneﬁts as well as the total amount of the public health insurance beneﬁts, even though the
amount of per capita beneﬁts are ﬁxed at the 2002 level in the future, if the current scheme is
30maintained. The ratio of public health insurance beneﬁts to GDP is expected to increase at 1
% every 10 years, and the ratio will be around 9.6% in 2050. The 2004 public pension reform
will successfully result in a 13 point decrease in the contribution rate from 36.44% to 23.53%,
and reduce the social security burden ratio to GDP by 8 points from 23.27% to 15.02% in 2050,
compared with the benchmark case.
Another striking result is that future technological progress will increase future tax burdens,
although an expansion of technological progress increases future GDP. In our simulation an
expansion of future technological progress results in an increase in the future equilibrium interest
rate, thus inducing an increase in the future consumption tax rate to ﬁnance more interest
payments incurred from government deﬁcits. The gaps between the interest rate and the GDP
growth rate become bigger rather than smaller as higher technological progress is assumed in
the future.
Although our estimation of technological progress based on the actual data of the last two
decades without an eﬀect of public capital on private production is quite close to zero, an
assumption of positive technological progress in the future seems more appropriate. Our simula-
tion result, particularly regarding the eﬀect of future technological progress, shows that interest
payments incurred by the huge amount of government debts will matter in the future due to
an increase in the interest rate. The actual interest rate is very low currently, but our simula-
tion result shows that if the future interest rate increases due to an expansion of technological
progress, or whatever, then a drastic increase in tax rates cannot be avoided. It is also worth
noting that Japan plays an important role in the world economy, implying that the domestic
interest rate cannot last to be relatively too low for a long time compared to other interest
rates in the global economy. In order to explore this eﬀect, our model should be extended to an
open economy model. However, an intuitive inference can be given within our closed economy
model: An expansion of the model to incorporate the intersection between Japan and other
world economies through the capital market will result in an increase in the Japanese interest
rate in simulations, and thus the future ﬁscal situation facing Japan will be predicted to be more
severe than our results of this paper. The diﬀerence in prediction of the future ﬁscal situation
in the literature comes from diﬀerent results regarding the gap between the interest rate and
the GDP growth rate. If our simulation results are compared to the actual ﬁscal situation, our
31results seem too pessimistic and unrealistic. However, if a possibility of an increase in the future
interest rate is taken into account, our simulation results can be more realistic rather than too
unrealistic.
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1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
腩膓腪
Actual Benchmark
High EarlyTable 1: Base Simulation Results
Bond GDP Primary Tax Social Security Social Security Public Pension Health Insurance Interest
Year Outstanding Growth Balance Burden Burden Contribution Beneﬁt Beneﬁt Rate n − r
(GDP Ratio)R a t e ( %), n (GDP Ratio)( GDP Ratio)( GDP Ratio)R a t e ( %)( GDP Ratio)( GDP Ratio)( %), r
Actual
2002 1.14 0.05 -8.48 15.62 9.69 18.57 7.75 5.89
Simulation Results
2003 1.21 0.73 -3.30 21.14 9.65 15.12 10.16 5.06 3.94 -3.20
2005 1.34 0.40 -2.43 22.21 10.18 15.94 10.73 5.21 3.59 -3.19
2010 1.60 0.04 0.43 25.70 11.95 18.71 12.53 5.67 2.89 -2.85
2015 1.71 -0.60 3.46 29.62 14.24 22.30 15.20 6.21 2.29 -2.89
2020 1.75 -0.57 4.63 31.35 15.82 24.78 16.74 6.70 2.05 -2.63
2025 1.75 -0.73 4.72 31.75 16.60 26.01 17.42 7.14 1.95 -2.68
2030 1.75 -1.11 5.19 32.62 17.53 27.45 18.37 7.62 1.83 -2.93
2035 1.75 -1.42 5.55 33.54 18.91 29.62 19.87 8.16 1.70 -3.12
2040 1.75 -1.59 5.72 34.54 21.02 32.93 22.35 8.66 1.62 -3.22
2045 1.75 -1.49 5.78 35.15 22.42 35.13 23.85 9.12 1.76 -3.26
2050 1.75 -1.46 6.20 35.93 23.27 36.44 24.68 9.59 2.03 -3.49
Note: The social security contribution rate is deﬁned as the ratio of the total amount of social security contributions to the total amount of wage income.Table 2: Bond Outstanding (GDP Ratio)
Year Base Debt Population Pension
High Low High Low
2003 1.21 1.22 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21
2005 1.34 1.37 1.33 1.34 1.34 1.34
2010 1.60 1.81 1.48 1.60 1.60 1.60
2015 1.71 2.30 1.50 1.71 1.71 1.71
2020 1.75 2.82 1.50 1.75 1.75 1.75
2025 1.75 3.34 1.50 1.75 1.75 1.75
2030 1.75 3.80 1.50 1.75 1.75 1.75
2035 1.75 4.18 1.50 1.75 1.75 1.75
2040 1.75 4.44 1.50 1.75 1.75 1.75
2045 1.75 4.50 1.50 1.75 1.75 1.75
2050 1.75 4.50 1.50 1.75 1.75 1.75
Table 3: Primary Balance (GDP Ratio)
Year Base Debt Population Pension
High Low High Low
2003 -3.30 -3.53 -3.32 -3.30 -3.29 -4.17
2005 -2.43 -3.57 -0.97 -2.43 -2.41 -3.46
2010 0.43 -3.73 2.97 0.43 0.45 -1.02
2015 3.46 -2.45 4.16 3.46 3.47 1.68
2020 4.63 -1.13 3.78 4.63 4.63 2.53
2025 4.72 1.81 3.89 4.69 4.74 2.37
2030 5.19 6.25 4.30 5.14 5.24 2.60
2035 5.55 11.00 4.60 5.47 5.62 2.72
2040 5.72 15.44 4.75 5.63 5.80 2.66
2045 5.78 19.65 4.79 5.70 5.86 2.45
2050 6.20 20.94 5.13 6.09 6.31 2.54
Table 4: Tax Burden (GDP Ratio)
Year Base Debt Population Pension
High Low High Low
2003 21.14 20.92 21.12 21.14 21.15 20.21
2005 22.21 21.08 23.67 22.21 22.22 21.07
2010 25.70 21.56 28.24 25.69 25.70 23.99
2015 29.62 23.75 30.31 29.60 29.61 27.36
2020 31.35 25.65 30.49 31.34 31.33 28.55
2025 31.75 28.93 30.91 31.70 31.76 28.38
2030 32.62 33.79 31.72 32.51 32.69 28.65
2035 33.54 39.12 32.59 33.35 33.71 28.83
2040 34.54 44.40 33.56 34.22 34.88 28.82
2045 35.15 49.16 34.15 34.67 35.71 28.63
2050 35.93 50.82 34.85 35.22 36.80 28.77Table 5: Social Security Burden (GDP Ratio)
Year Base Debt Population Pension
High Low High Low
2003 9.65 9.62 9.66 9.63 9.63 9.82
2005 10.18 10.13 10.18 10.15 10.15 10.23
2010 11.95 11.84 11.99 11.91 11.91 11.65
2015 14.24 14.08 14.27 14.19 14.19 13.43
2020 15.82 15.62 15.84 15.76 15.77 14.47
2025 16.60 16.40 16.62 16.53 16.56 14.50
2030 17.53 17.34 17.54 17.39 17.57 14.57
2035 18.91 18.75 18.92 18.61 19.15 14.67
2040 21.02 20.91 21.03 20.41 21.67 14.82
2045 22.42 22.35 22.43 21.39 23.64 14.94
2050 23.27 23.18 23.28 21.73 25.22 15.02
Table 6: Social Security Contribution Rate
Year Base Debt Population Pension
High Low High Low
2003 15.12 15.06 15.13 15.09 15.08 15.38
2005 15.94 15.86 15.94 15.90 15.89 16.02
2010 18.71 18.55 18.78 18.65 18.65 18.25
2015 22.30 22.05 22.36 22.23 22.23 21.04
2020 24.78 24.47 24.81 24.69 24.70 22.66
2025 26.01 25.68 26.03 25.89 25.94 22.72
2030 27.45 27.15 27.47 27.24 27.52 22.82
2035 29.62 29.37 29.63 29.14 30.00 22.98
2040 32.93 32.75 32.95 31.97 33.94 23.22
2045 35.13 35.00 35.14 33.50 37.03 23.40
2050 36.44 36.31 36.46 34.04 39.51 23.53
Note: The social security contribution rate is deﬁned as the ratio of the total amount of social
security contributions to the total amount of wage income.
Table 7: Deviation from The Base Case of Utility
Year Debt Population Pension
High Low High Low
2003 -0.15 0.05 0.01 0.01 -1.03
2005 0.02 -0.33 0.02 0.01 -1.03
2010 0.60 -0.59 0.04 0.00 -0.99
2015 0.86 -0.13 0.07 -0.03 -0.90
2020 0.73 0.23 0.11 -0.09 -0.65
2025 0.00 0.23 0.19 -0.20 -0.28
2030 -0.96 0.25 0.31 -0.40 0.18
2035 -2.05 0.27 0.49 -0.72 0.77
2040 -3.16 0.30 0.77 -1.20 1.53
2045 -4.33 0.33 1.14 -1.88 2.31
2050 -4.67 0.37 1.61 -2.77 3.07Table 8: 0.5% of Annual Technological Progress, and 1% of Annual Increase in Medical Expenses
GDP Primary Tax Social Security Social Security Interest
Year Growth Balance Burden Burden Contribution rate Rate n − r
Rate (%), n (GDP Ratio)( GDP Ratio)( GDP Ratio)R a t e ( %)( %), r
Simulation Results
2003 1.11 -3.03 21.45 9.63 15.09 4.57 -3.46
2005 0.84 -2.01 22.68 10.16 15.92 4.37 -3.53
2010 0.59 1.18 26.54 11.99 18.77 3.93 -3.34
2015 0.01 4.40 30.70 14.37 22.50 3.48 -3.47
2020 0.09 5.72 32.63 16.04 25.12 3.36 -3.27
2025 -0.02 5.88 33.15 16.92 26.50 3.34 -3.36
2030 -0.38 6.39 34.10 17.96 28.13 3.26 -3.64
2035 -0.68 6.77 35.09 19.47 30.50 3.16 -3.84
2040 -0.85 6.97 36.18 21.72 34.02 3.10 -3.95
2045 -0.74 7.11 36.92 23.25 36.42 3.29 -4.03
2050 -0.71 7.60 37.83 24.22 37.94 3.61 -4.31
Note: The social security contribution (GDP ratio) is deﬁned as the ratio of the total amount of social security contributions to
the total amount of wage income.
Table 9: 1% of Annual Technological Progress, and 1% of Annual Increase in Medical Expenses
GDP Primary Tax Social Security Social Security Interest
Year Growth Balance Burden Burden Contribution rate Rate n − r
Rate (%), n (GDP Ratio)( GDP Ratio)( GDP Ratio)R a t e ( %)( %), r
Simulation Results
2003 1.39 -2.33 22.17 9.46 14.81 5.48 -4.09
2005 1.19 -1.05 23.66 9.91 15.52 5.49 -4.30
2010 1.07 2.75 28.10 11.53 18.07 5.45 -4.38
2015 0.58 6.37 32.61 13.72 21.48 5.24 -4.66
2020 0.72 8.02 34.80 15.16 23.74 5.33 -4.61
2025 0.65 8.36 35.42 15.80 24.74 5.46 -4.81
2030 0.33 8.98 36.40 16.57 25.96 5.48 -5.15
2035 0.04 9.42 37.35 17.80 27.87 5.43 -5.39
2040 -0.12 9.71 38.41 19.73 30.90 5.42 -5.54
2045 0.00 9.98 39.15 20.91 32.75 5.70 -5.70
2050 0.05 10.61 40.07 21.51 33.69 6.11 -6.07
Note: The social security contribution (GDP ratio) is deﬁned as the ratio of the total amount of social security contributions to
the total amount of wage income.
Table 10: 1% of Annual Technological Progress, and 0% of Annual Increase in Medical Expenses
GDP Primary Tax Social Security Social Security Interest
Year Growth Balance Burden Burden Contribution rate Rate n − r
Rate (%), n (GDP Ratio)( GDP Ratio)( GDP Ratio)R a t e ( %)( %), r
Simulation Results
2003 1.33 -2.02 22.48 9.34 14.62 5.69 -4.36
2005 1.14 -0.67 24.01 9.70 15.20 5.73 -4.60
2010 1.03 3.28 28.52 11.11 17.40 5.75 -4.72
2015 0.55 7.00 33.04 13.05 20.44 5.58 -5.03
2020 0.70 8.70 35.19 14.24 22.30 5.70 -5.00
2025 0.64 9.06 35.73 14.62 22.91 5.85 -5.21
2030 0.33 9.67 36.60 15.14 23.72 5.87 -5.54
2035 0.05 10.08 37.42 16.10 25.22 5.81 -5.77
2040 -0.11 10.34 38.34 17.77 27.84 5.79 -5.90
2045 0.02 10.57 38.95 18.71 29.30 6.06 -6.04
2050 0.07 11.16 39.73 19.06 29.85 6.46 -6.38
Note: The social security contribution (GDP ratio) is deﬁned as the ratio of the total amount of social security contributions to
the total amount of wage income.